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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH HOLBROOK and GENEVE 
K. HOLBROOK, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
vs. 
ELWOOD S. CARTER and LINDA 
N. CARTER, 
Defendants, 
J. HENRY EHLERS and NELLIE 
J. EHLERS, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
Case No. 
10777 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents seek to quiet title to certain real 
property acquired by quit claim deeds and adverse 
possession. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court quieted title in favor of plain-
tiffs-respondents (Holbrooks) and dismissed the 
counterclaim of defendants-appellants (Ehlers). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute in this case ; how-
ever, the Appellants, in their attempt to summarize 
them in their brief, have left out some very pertinent 
ones. Therefore, the facts as stipulated to by the 
parties and upon which the Lower Court based its 
judgment are here set out in full: (R-21 through 
R-23). 
"l. That on July 1, 1949 at the so-called Salt 
Lake County May Sale, Salt Lake County sold to 
Rennold Pender, Margaret J. Eliason and defend-
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ant, J. Henry Ehlers, the property described in · 
the Complaint on file herein which is the subject mat-
ter of this litigation, and gave to said Rennold Pen-
der, Margaret J. Eliason and J. Henry Ehlers its 
so-called tax deed covering said property. 
"At the time of the receipt of said deed, Pender 
and J. Henry Ehlers orally agreed between them-
selves that Pender could use the land as to Ehler's 
interest and for such use would pay taxes thereon 
attributable to Ehlers; that plaintiffs had no knowl-
edge of this oral agreement at any time pertinent 
herein. (Emphasis Added) 
"2. That on or about June 11, 1951, Rennold 
Pender for a good and valuable consideration made 
and executed his Quit Claim Deed to plaintiffs con-
veying his interest to them in the subject property, 
and that on or about June 21, 1951, Margaret, J. 
Eliason for a good and valuable consideration exe-
cuted and delivered to plaintiffs her Quit Claim 
Deed conveying her interest in said property. 
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"3. That shortly after receipt of the Pender 
and Eliason deeds as set forth above, planitiffs con-
tacted defendant, J. H. Ehlers, through one W. Louis 
Gardner to ascertain if Ehlers would sell his inter-
est in the subject property to plaintiffs. Ehlers stated 
to Gardner that he would not sell. 
"4. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants, Ehlers, 
have ever had personal contact or discussions with 
each other concerning the property. 
"5. That immediately following the receipt of 
the two deeds' aforesaid by plaintiffs, plaintiffs took 
physical possession of the property and enclosed the 
same with a strong, stock-proof, wire and post fence, 
which said fence has, since the date of erection on 
or about the month of July, 1951, stood in good re-
pair against all persons. That plaintiffs have dur-
ing said 15 years and at various time affixed to the 
wire enclosing said field, signs of various types, 
particularly during hunting seasons, which said 
signs have stated 'No Tresspassing,' 'No Hunting,' 
'Private Property' and related wording. That for 
said 15 years last past plaintiffs have had good and 
sufficient gates at the entrance to said enclosure sur-
rounding said real property. 
"6. That defendant, J. Henry Ehlers, was per-
sonally aware that defendants had fenced the prop-
erty as set forth in paragraph 5 next above and 
personally went through the gates in said fence en-
closing the property at one time or another subse-
quent to the fencing. 
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"7. That for the first three or four agricultural 
seasons following June, 1951, plaintiffs plowed the 
property, sowed various grains therein and har-
vested the same. That for the last ten years, approx-
imately, plaintiffs have plowed and seeded the land 
to alfalfa and pasturage. That during said 15 years 
last past plaintiffs have irrigated said land with 
irrigation water, which water was their sole and 
separate property. 
"8. That at no time during said 15 years last 
past has the public at large ever had any physical 
ingress or egress of said property by reason of the 
installation of the fences, gates and the constant 
surveillance and supervision of the property by plain-
tiffs. That plaintiffs in connection with their farm-
ing and agricultural usages of other lands surround-
ing the subject premises have rented the use of the 
subject premises for pasturage and so forth and have 
held themselves out to the public at large as the own-
ers thereof, and have duly collected any rents imposed 
for pasturage thereon. 
"9. That plaintiffs have paid all and singular, 
the total property taxes assessed against said prop-
erty since the year 1951 to date hereof, and the 
defendants, nor any of them, have not paid any of 
said taxes nor have offered to reimburse plaintiffs 
for the payment of said taxes. Defendant, J. Henry 
Ehlers, from time to time during said 15-year period 
personally checked the Salt Lake County records and 
determined that the taxes had been paid by plain-
tiffs. 
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"10. That defendant, J. H. Ehlers, from some 
time prior to July, 1949 and during the 15 years 
subsequent thereto has been aware of acts necessary 
to adverse fee title owners by one relying upon color 
of title through a tax deed having made it a practice 
to purchase the so-called tax deeds from Salt Lake 
County and has been, at all times pertinent herein, 
generally familiar with the laws of the State of Utah 
governing the doctrine of adverse possession; that he 
has perfected title in the time above set forth to cer-
tain tax deeds which he has purchased, by means of 
purchase, adverse 'possession litigation and related 
means. 
"To the extent that the within and foregoing 
Stipulation of Facts contradicts the factual state-
ments set forth in the affidavits of plaintiffs and 
defendants on file herein, this Stipulation of Facts 
shall prevail over assertions of fact in said affidavits. 
"WITNESS OUR HANDS this 14th day of 
October, 1966. 
"Isl Christian Ronnow 
CHRISTIAN RONNOW 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
57 4 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
"Isl Milton V. Backman 
MILTON V. BACKMAN 
Attorney for Defendants, 
Ehlers 
1111 Deseret Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah" 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT QUIET-
ING TITLE IN THE HOLBROOKS MUST BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE HOLBROOKS AC-
QUIRED COLOR OF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY 
BY QUIT CLAIM DEEDS AND SUBSEQUENT-
LY SATISFIED THE UTAH STATUTORY RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Color of Title: 
The Holbrooks purchased the real property in 
question from Rennold Pender and Margaret J. Elia-
son by quit claim deeds. Certified copies of the quit 
claim deeds are included in the file of this matter, 
and the Court is requested to take judicial notice of 
each deed. This Court can and has taken judicial 
notice of such documents which appear of public 
record. State Board of Land Commissioners, et al. 
v. Ririe, 56 U. 213, 190 P. 59, (1920); McGarry 
v. Thompson, 114 U. 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948). 
Adverse Possession : 
The Utah Legislature has set out provisions 
whereby title to property can be acquired by adverse 
possession. Section 78-12-8, U.C.A. 1953 provides in 
part: 
Whenever it appears that the occupant 
... entered into possession of the property 
under claim of title, exclusive of other right, 
founding such claim upon a written instru-
ment as being a conveyance of the property 
in question ... and that there has been a 
continued occupation and possession of the 
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property included in such instrument . . . or 
of some part of the property under such claim 
for seven years, the property so included is 
deemed to have been [held] adversely ... 
Section 78-12-9, U.C.A., 1953 sets forth the re-
quirements of obtaining title by adverse possession 
as follows: 
For the purpose of constituting an ad-
verse possession by any person claiming a 
title founded upon a written instrument or 
a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have 
been possessed and occupied in the following 
cases: 
( 1) Where it has been usually cultivated 
or improved. 
(2) Where it has been protected by a 
substantial inclosure. 
( 3) Where, although not inclosed, it has 
been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing 
timber for the purpose of husbandry, or for 
pasturage or for the ordinary use of the occu-
pancy. 
( 4) ... 
The Holbrooks have been in possession for over 
fifteen ( 15) years, twice the required period! 
The Holbrooks have paid all of the taxes on the 
property since 1951 ! 
Immediately after taking possession, the Hol-
brooks inclosed the real property with a "strong, 
stock-proof, wire and fence post," which said fence 
has since the date of its erection in July of 1951 stood 
in good repair against all persons. 
8 
The Holbrooks have attached to the fence signs 
such as: "No Hunting," "No Trespassing," and 
"Private Property." 
Gates have been installed and maintained by the / 
Holbrooks at the entrances to the real property for 
over fifteen ( 15) years. 
For the first three or four agricultural seasons 
following June, 1951, the Holbrooks plowed the prop-
erty. They planted various grains and harvested the 
crops. 
For the last approximate ten (10) years, the 1 
Holbrooks have plowed and seeded the land to alfalfa 
and pasturage. 
During the fifteen ( 15) years, the Holbrooks 
have irrigated the land with their own water. 
The Holbrooks have prevented the public from 
entering the property by reason of the fences, gates, 
and personal supervision and surveilance. 
The Holbrooks have rented part of the ground 
out for pasturage. 
The Holbrooks have held themselves out to the 
public as the owners of the land. 
Point II 
THE HOLBROOKS ARE "STRANGERS" TO 
EHLERS, NOT CO-TENANTS, AND THERE-
FORE, THE HOLBROOKS' ASSERTION OF 
OPEN AND EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP IN SEV-
ERALTY CONSTITUTES AN OUSTER AS TO 
EHLERS, AND AFTER SEVEN YEARS TITLE 
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BY ADVERSE POSSESSION BECAME VESTED 
IN THE HOLBROOKS. 
Appellants brief would lead the Court to believe 
that the Holbrooks and Ehlers are co-tenants and 
that this matter falls within the body of law anno-
tated in 85 A.L.R. 1535 entitled "Right of CoTenant 
to Acquire and Assert Adverse Title or Interest As 
Against Other CoTenant." 
Do not be misled. The Holbrooks are properly 
characterized as "strangers" to the Ehlers, not "co-
tenants." This matter is thoroughly treated in 32 
A.L.R.2d 1214 under the heading, "Possession By 
Stranger Claiming Under Conveyance By Cotenant 
As Adverse To Other Cotenants. Therein the proper 
rule is stated as follows: 
§2. General Rule (Supplementing 27 A.L.R. 8) 
The general rule stated in the original 
annotation that, where one of several coten-
ants conveys the joint estate by an instrument 
purporting to vest the fee to the entire prop-
erty in a grantee who is not a cotenant, and 
the latter enters, asserting open and exclusive 
ownership thereof, in severalty, the cotenant 
not participating in the conveyance is deemed 
to be ousted, and, on the termination of the 
statutory period, title by adverse possession 
becomes vested in the grantee. 
See also 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession §182, 
71A.L.R.444. 
The fact that the conveyances were by Quit 
Claim Deeds would not alter this situation. See 32 
A.L.R.2d 1221, 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession 
§183 . 
• 
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In addition, the fact that the Respondents knew 
and in 1951 tried, through a third party, to purchase 
the Appellants' interest is not a circumstance that 
would preclude the ripening of title by adverse pos-
session. 32 A.L.R.2d 1224. 
Ehlers, Pender and Eliason bought the property 
at tax sale. They were co-tenants. 
Pender and Eliason later conveyed by quit claim 
deed to the Holbrooks. Ehlers and the Holbrooks were 
thus "strangers", not co-tenants. 
Pender and Eliason did not expressly convey 
just "a one-third interest" or "his interest" or "her 
interest." The language of the deed purports to con-
vey the entire interest. The certified copies of the 
deeds show the exact language. 
In McCready v. Fredericksen, 41 U. 388, 126 
P. 316 (1912) which the Appellants cite, there was 
a conveyance by one of the co-tenants to Frederick-
sen, a third party. The Court by way of dicta said 
that if the grantee of one of the co-tenants had been ' 
in possession under the co-tenant's deed, claiming 
title to the whole of the property, for the time re-
quired by the Statute of Limitations, he would have 
acquired title by adverse possession. 
Point III 
EVEN ON APPELLANTS ERRONEOUS 
THEORY THAT HOLBROOK AND EHLERS 
WERE CO-TENANTS, THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE ACTS 
• 
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OF HOLBROOK WERE SUFFICIENT TO AC-
QUIRE TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION 
EVEN AS TO A CO-TENANT. 
Appellants cite the following as the law for one 
co-tenant adversing another co-tenant: 
... he [the co-tenant in possession] must 
show that at the time in question he was per-
sonally, or by tenant or agent, in actual pos-
session of the premises, or of the particular 
and sufficiently defined part of the premises 
to which he makes claim, that he intended an 
actual adverse possession operative as of that 
time, that he did in fact hold and claim the 
premises adversely, and lastly, that his co-
tenant or co-tenants had knowledge or notice 
of that fact ... (82 A.L.R. 2d 5 at pp. 23, 24) 
It is agreed between the parties that the Re-
spondents held possession of the premises for ap-
proximately 15 years from June 1951 and continu-
ously thereafter. Thus, the requirement of actual 
possession is clearly satisfied. The second require-
ment that the Respondents intended actual adverse 
possession is apparent from the agreed facts setting 
out their exclusive, hostile possession. The only ques-
tion that properly could be inquired into on this ap-
peal under Appellant's theory is whether the Appel-
lants had notice of the adverse possession. 
The Lower Court found the facts were sufficient 
to put the Appellants on notice that the Respondents 
intended to and were holding the property adverse to 
Appellants' interest. In this connection it should be 
pointed out that unless the Lower Court's judgment 
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is clearly against the weight of the evidence or un-
less the Court has misapplied the principles of law 
or equity, the finding of the Lower Court should 
not be disturbed. Heiselt vs. Heiselt, 10 U2d 126, 
349 P.2d 175 ( 1960). See also Clotworthy vs. Clyde, 
1 U.2d 251, 265 P.2d 420, So unless it is clear 
from the agreed facts that the facts do not import 
notice to the Appellants of the open, notorious and 
exclusive possession of the Respondents, the Lower 
Court's finding should be affirmed. Viewing all of 
the facts together, there is clearly more than enough 
weight to warrant the determination of the Lower 
Court. 
Although generally the possession of property 
by one co-tenant is considered to be for the benefit 
of the other co-tenant, this does not mean that a co-
tenant cannot hold adversely to another co-tenant. 
This is true only because of the close relationship 
between co-tenants. One co-tenant's occupancy is 
considered for the benefit of other co-tenants only 1 
until there are facts that show his occupancy is in 
repudiation of the rights of other co-tenants. 
McCready vs. Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 
Pac. 316 (1912), which the Appellants cite, sets out 
the rule in Utah for obtaining title by adverse posses-
sion from a co-tenant. Under that case there is no 
requirement of actual ouster. The possession must 
be of such an open and notorious nature so as to 
clearly show the world that this possession is in-
tended to exclude and does exclude the rights of co-
tenants. Nevertheless, under the McCready rule, 
1:-3 
notice of ouster need not be actual, but may be im-
plied from conduct. 
There is a rule widely accepted in other juris-
dictions that notice of ouster may be implied from 
the long uninterrupted possession of property by a 
co-tenant. Dixon vs. Henderson, 267 S.W.2d 869; 
Black vs. Beagle, 59 Wyo. 268, 139, P.2d 439 ( 1943), 
82 A.L.R.2d 132. The Court in Sperry vs. Tolley, 
114 Utah 312, 199 P.2d 542 favorably acknowledged 
this rule. There, the Court said: 
Some jurisdictions hold that a sole, unin-
terrupted possession together with the exclu-
sive taking of profits by one tenant in 
common, with the knowledge by the others, 
continued for a long series of years, without 
any possession or claim of right and without 
any participation in the profits, or demand for 
them, if unexplained by any evidence tending 
to show a reason for such neglect to assert a 
right is sufficient to inf er an ouster and 
adverse possession. 
The Respondents have held the property for 15 
years, more than double the duration of the Statute 
of Limitations. During that entire period they have 
collected the rents and profits, leased the property, put 
up no trespassing signs, paid taxes, farmed the prop-
erty, fenced it, irrigated it, and in every respect 
maintained exclusive and adverse possession against 
all the world including the Appellants. At no time 
have Appellants asserted any interest or claim to 
title. They have made no demand for sharing in the 
profits and have had absolutely no contact with the 
Respondents, nor have Appellants offered any ex-
14 
planation as to the reason for sleeping on their rights. 
Consequently, the long, continued delay coupled with 
the exclusive, hostile possession of the Respondents 
is sufficient to infer an ouster and adverse posses-
s10n. 
The Appellants, in their brief, attempt, by re-
ferring to previous cases, to establish what acts are 
1 
required to impute notice of adverse possession to 
a co-tenant. They claim that the facts now before the 
Court are insufficient by asserting that such acts 
were held insufficient in the McCready, Sperry and 
Heiselt cases. This conclusion is improper and would 
be unfair if followed since the facts in this case are 
different. So that justice might prevail, each case 
should be decided on its own merits taking all fac-
tors into consideration. What is not sufficient in one 1 
case might be sufficient in another. In Linebarger 
v. Late, 214 Ark. 278, 216 S.W.2d 56 ( 1948) the 
Court recognized this. The Court said: 
Notice of the hostility of the possession 
resulting from acts or conduct of the possessor 
may appear in so many ways that judges and 
text writers have not undertaken an enumera-
tion. What in one case would be sufficient 
warning might not be enough in another. The 
rewtionship of the parties, their reasonable 
access to the property and opportunity of or 
necessity for dealing with it, their right to 
rely upon the ~onduct and assur~nc~s of t~e 
one in possession, matters of kmsh1p, busi-
ness transactions directly or incidentally 
touching the primary subject matter, the fact 
of silence when there was a duty to speak, 
natural inferences arising from indifference 
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- these and other means of conveying or 
concealing intent may be important in a par-
ticular case but not controlling in another; 
consequently, there can be no "open and shut 
rule" by which the result can be ascertained. 
(Emphasis added) 
One of the reasons for the rule that the posses-
sion of one co-tenant is possession for the others is 
because of their right to rely upon each other. Where 
the relationship is interrupted by a conveyance to 
a third party stranger, what right does the other 
co-tenant have to assume that the grantee will con-
tinue to hold possession for him and account to him 
for all income and rent. The logical inference is for 
him to be apprised that the grantees' interest may 
be adverse to him. He at least has some duty to speak 
and where a co-tenant sleeps on his rights for as long 
as the Appellants have done without any contact or 
any claim or assertion of their rights or without even 
any explanation for the reason of their long delay, 
the clear implication is that they have notice of oust-
er. When the Appellants' knowledge and understand-
ing of the law of adverse possession is considered and 
when, in fact, it is considered that the Appellants 
themselves have utilized the doctrine to obtain clear 
title to property purchased under tax deeds, notice 
of ouster seems conclusive. The least that could be 
said is that any reasonably prudent person would 
have been on notice. In Black vs. Beagle (see supra) 
the Court said: 
From such acts it is the duty of the other 
co-tenants to be informed thereof and to draw 
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such reasonable inferences therefrom as pru-
dent persons possessed of and interested in 
like information would naturally do, and such 
co-tenants out of possession cannot prevent 
the operation of the Statute of Limitations by 
proving that they did not know of the facts 
affecting their interest or knowing of them 
did not draw correct conclusions therefrom 
... We think that, under the circumstances, 
he can hardly come into a court of equity with 
any hope of success. (Emphasis added) 
Furthermore, the language of the deed from 
Pender and Eliason to the Holbrooks purporting to 
convey the entire interest would put Appellants on 
notice that the Holbrooks were holding adversely to 
them. 
ARGUMENT 
Point IV 
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS REL~ 
TIVE TO PERMISSIVE POSSESSION OF THE 
REAL PROPERTY AND NO KNOWLEDGE BY 
HOLBROOK OF THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT 
OF PERMISSIVE POSSESSION AS BETWEEN 
PENDER AND APPELLANT; HENCE, THE AL-
LEGED AGREEMENT IS NO BAR TO ADVERSE 
POSSESSION. 
Appellants claim that an agreement of the Ap-
pellants to allow their co-tenant to possess the prop-
erty precludes the assertion of title by adverse posses-
sion. There was no such agreement between the 
17 
Appellants and the Respondents here. (See italicized 
last sentence of FACT STIPULATION, Paragraph 
No. 1.) This is definitely not a case of permissive 
possession as the Appellants' brief argues. It was 
stipulated that the alleged agreement was between 
the Appellants and Mr. Pender, and that the Re-
spondents "have never had knowledge of their agree-
ment." 
The very existence of the agreement puts some 
burden on the Appellants to inquire of the Respond-
ents as to their intent with respect to the property. 
Since there is no basis either in law or in fact for 
the Appellants to rely upon an agreement made with 
one grantor of the Respondents, it would be unreas-
onable and unfair to bind the Respondents to it. It 
cannot be assumed that by the purchase of one co-
tenant's interest in the property that the purchaser 
steps in the shoes of that co-tenant with respect to 
a verbal agreement made between the co-tenants 
three years prior. Such an assumption would be un-
reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Respondents were strangers to Appel-
lants not co-tenants, the law clearly supports the 
judgment quieting title. But, even assuming the rela-
tionship of co-tenancy, the Appellants were on notice 
of their adverse possession establishing clear title in 
Respondents. The Lower Court's judgment should be 
18 
affirmed since the weight of evidence supports it 
and there was no misapplication of any principal 
of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MABEY, RONNOW, 
MADSEN & MARSDEN 
By ------------- ------- --- -- ---------- ---
J. FRED WRIGHT 
574 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plain ti j f s-Respondents 
